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Abstract—The Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA)
guidance represents the consensus of various national aviation
authorities on a common process to identify, qualitatively assess,
and manage the safety risk posed by unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS), when preparing the safety case required for regulatory
approval to conduct certain types of operations. As such, it can
be considered a de facto standard, being increasingly adopted by
various relevant stakeholders. This paper first gives an overview
of the SORA process and associated methods, identifying a num-
ber of inconsistencies in risk identification and assessment, also
discussing plausible strategies to close the associated gaps. Then,
we give a well-founded basis for the applicable concepts, such as
barrier integrity, assurance, and robustness, following which we
present a preliminary and simple probabilistic formalization of
the underpinning barrier-based safety model. We illustrate our
overall approach through a worked example, also discussing how
a Bayesian framework can facilitate extending and enhancing
our initial formalization. We conclude with a discussion of the
opportunities afforded by our approach, such as a well-founded
basis for barrier selection, whilst addressing the associated
challenges. The main objective of this work is to complement the
current SORA guidance through a principled, mathematically-
based approach to risk assessment, particularly when it is applied
to higher-risk operational concepts that warrant greater rigor in
safety assessment and assurance.
Index Terms—Bayesian analysis, Risk assessment, Risk quan-
tification, Safety architecture, Safety case, Unmanned aircraft
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA) [1] is both
a methodology and guidance being promulgated by the Joint
Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS)—
an international consortium of national aviation authorities
(NAAs) and regional aviation safety organizations—to support
applications for authorization to operate unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) in civil airspace. At its core, SORA1 is an
approach to safety risk management (SRM), providing an
uncomplicated and convenient means to qualitatively evaluate
the safety risk associated with so-called specific category
UAS operations, and determine whether those risks have been
reduced to an acceptable level. Specific category operations are
those whose level of safety risk falls between that posed by
operations in the open category and the certified category. The
1Henceforth, we will use the acronym in reference to the overall approach,
the specific guidance document, as well as the constituent processes and
methods, qualifying our usage when the context is unclear.
former constitutes very low risk operations, while the latter
typically require type, airworthiness, and operator certification,
as well as flight crew licensing [2].
In its current form, i.e., version 1.0 [1], SORA is based on
a barrier model of safety which can be represented using bow
tie diagrams (BTDs), a graphical elaboration of safety-relevant
scenarios and the suite of related SRM measures (termed as
barriers). Exemplifying a flexible and risk-based approach to
trade off safety-relevant considerations—e.g., technical airwor-
thiness, equipment and operator performance and capabilities,
and operating rules, restrictions, and procedures—it effectively
provides a basis for the operational safety case, so that the
safety measures employed are proportional to the risk posed
by the particular operational concept. An upcoming SORA
revision2 (i.e., version 2.0) has refocused on the application
of the core methodology and the underlying process, though
it continues to be implicitly based on BTDs. Section II gives
a background on BTDs, SORA, and their interrelationship.
This paper adopts the position that the current, largely
qualitative approach to (both versions of the) SORA can
benefit from the rigor of a mathematical basis, especially
when it is being applied to higher-risk operational concepts,
e.g., beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) overflight of urban,
populated areas. Section III motivates our position based on
gaps and inconsistencies we have identified in the SORA, and
also discusses potential resolutions.
Then, in Section IV, we develop well-founded notions for
various SORA concepts including barrier integrity, assurance,
correction factor, integrity level, assurance level, robustness,
and robustness level. Thereafter, we advance a preliminary,
mathematically-based risk assessment approach, where we
build a probabilistic model of the safety-relevant scenarios
described using BTDs (e.g., those considered in the SORA
guidance). We also discuss extending our model to a notion
of safety architecture (SA) [3], itself an extension to BTDs.
We have implemented this model in our assurance case
tool, AdvoCATE [4], which we used in creating a UAS safety
case that successfully underwent regulatory scrutiny [5], to
facilitate obtaining operational flight approval in the context of
2Presently, drafts of SORA v2.0 and several of its annexes are undergoing a
so-called JARUS External Consultation, where the documents undergo public
review and feedback, prior to final publication and release. Available at:
http://jarus-rpas.org/sites/jarus-rpas.org/files/press release no 24.pdf
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180006839 2019-08-31T17:56:47+00:00Z
UAS Traffic Management (UTM) flight testing [6]. Based on
this safety case, we present a simplified example to illustrate
the feasibility and utility of the formalization as a well-founded
implementation that conforms to the intent of the SORA.
Subsequently, Section V discusses extending and enhancing
our preliminary model, by i) formalizing barrier integrity
quantification, and capturing the role of escalation factors
(EFs)—described next in Section II-A—that affect barrier
performance, and ii) using a Bayesian probabilistic framework,
to capture relations between barriers, and to quantify risk
reduction as a query on the joint distribution of the associated
random variables (RVs).
Then, Section VI discusses how our approach not only
resolves the identified gaps (see Section III), but also provides
opportunities for complementing SORA, e.g., updating the risk
assessment based on operational data, including additional or
related risk models, and providing a well-founded basis for
selecting barriers and for specifying barrier integrities based on
the desired safety targets. Finally, we consider the challenges
associated with our approach, discuss potential solutions, and
conclude highlighting avenues for future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Bow Tie Diagrams
Bow tie diagrams (BTDs), which realize a barrier model of
safety, provide a graphical means to visualize and assess the
risk scenarios associated with a given hazard [7]. Fig. 1 shows
the main elements of a BTD, shown in graphical notation as
implemented in our tool, AdvoCATE [4], [8] (see Fig. 3 for a
more generic representation).
A hazard is a controlled activity, condition, or entity that
reflects a normal, often desirable, aspect of the concept of
operations (CONOPS), e.g., UAS operations near an airport.
A top event is an undesired system state where control over
the hazard is lost, e.g., a loss of separation from other aircraft.
A threat is a possible direct cause or source of a top event,
e.g., unanticipated course deviation. A consequence represents
the dangerous outcome or loss state that results when a top
event cannot be contained after it has occurred, e.g., a midair
collision (MAC) with fatalities.
To manage threats and top events, we employ controls—any
process, function, device, practice, or other action that modifies
safety risk. A barrier is a collection or system of controls
working, similarly, to modify (reduce) safety risk. For instance,
a surveillance system represents a technical barrier comprising
controls such as detection and tracking, classification, alerting
and advisory, etc. Escalation factors (EFs) are weaknesses,
vulnerabilities, threats, or operational conditions that can com-
promise, defeat, or otherwise degrade control effectiveness,
e.g., electromagnetic interference. Escalation factor barriers
(EFBs), analogous to barriers, are a secondary system of
controls used to manage, reduce, or modify the impact of EFs.
Prevention barriers (controls) represent mitigation measures
that target reducing the probability of the top event, and are
shown preceding the top event. Recovery barriers (controls)
contribute to reducing the probability and/or the magnitude
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of BTD elements as implemented in our safety
assurance case tool, AdvoCATE.
of the severity of the consequence after a top event has
occurred, and are shown following a top event. The visual
ordering of barriers and controls loosely corresponds to the
temporal order in which they may be invoked. However, BTDs
(intentionally) abstract from specifying the exact ordering
and organization of barriers (and their constituent controls)
between successive events since those correspond to design
decisions made typically after determining, at this abstract
level, that the barriers being deployed can provide sufficient
safety risk reduction.
Threats are assumed to occur independently, i.e., there is a
possibility for threats to occur simultaneously and, therefore,
they are not disjoint. Depending on the CONOPS, conse-
quences may or may not be disjoint events. With this interpre-
tation, threats, top events and consequences can be ascribed an
initial and a residual risk level, computed as a combination of
their (initial/residual) probabilities of occurrence and severity.
Barriers and controls are each ascribed a measure of integrity,
relating to the probability that barriers are (not) breached in a
dangerous manner.
Although the BTD elements in SORA v1.0 are concep-
tually identical to those given here, SORA introduces mi-
nor terminological differences along with a few additional
concepts (described next, in Section II-B). As mentioned
earlier, SORA v2.0 is implicitly based on BTDs, referring
to the more general, model-agnostic, terms of mitigation and
operational safety objective (OSO), rather than harm and
threat barrier, respectively. However, it retains the concepts
of integrity, assurance, and robustness, whilst referring to a
so-called holistic risk model. In fact, this is the generic BTD
that underpins the methodology developed in SORA v1.0 [1].
B. Specific Operations Risk Assessment
We mainly describe SORA v1.0 and, except for some sim-
plifying modifications to the process steps, the core approach
remains largely unchanged in SORA v2.0. Since the final
revision of the latter is yet to be made publicly available, we do
not give more details on it here. The SORA process starts with
risk modeling, is followed by a risk assessment, and culminates
with recommendations on the mitigation measures to be used
for SRM. Fig. 2 shows the different tasks across these activities
and the associated data flow, based on our understanding of
the process.
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Fig. 2. SORA data flow starts with risk modeling and produces recommenda-
tions on risk mitigation barrier robustness, and the associated safety objectives.
1) Risk Modeling: Risk modeling, which is based on BTDs,
focuses on a nonspecific operational hazard (UAS operation
out of control) and three broad consequences—namely fatal-
ities to non-participating third parties on the ground, in the
air, and damage to critical infrastructure—whilst identifying
generic threats, e.g., technical issue with the UAS, adverse
operating conditions, etc. The focus, however, is mainly on
the former two, i.e., the ground collision consequence (GCC),
and the air collision consequence (ACC).
The results of risk modeling also include candidate harm
barriers to mitigate consequence risk, and threat barriers to
manage the identified threats.3 An orthogonal organization
of barriers that applies mainly to the ACC consists of so-
called strategic and tactical mitigations The former constitute
barriers used prior to flight operations, while the latter are
employed during flight. Depending on when a strategic or
tactical mitigation is invoked, they can function in either a
prevention or a recovery role.
2) Risk Assessment: The risk assessment activity comprises
several steps that build upon each other to provide a qualitative
risk assessment for the GCC and the ACC. Fig. 2 shows these
steps as tasks that follow the initial risk modeling task, and
which precede the SORA recommendations task.
a) Initial Ground and Air Collision Risk Determination:
These activities start from the characteristics of the CONOPS
that contribute to each consequence, e.g., aircraft dimensions,
kinetic energy, operating area type, and population density are
amongst the factors affecting GCC risk. Similarly, ACC risk
depends on the operating airspace type and class, operating
altitude, encounter rate, airspace geometry and structure, and
aircraft dynamics. SORA uses these characteristics to classify
and order operational scenarios in terms of their relative un-
mitigated risk, i.e., the risk posed without taking into account
any risk reducing mitigation measures.
For the GCC, 8 broad operational scenarios have been
identified, each assigned a ground risk class (GRC)—a relative
3Harm and threat barriers are SORA v1.0 terminology for recovery and
prevention barriers, respectively.
risk ranking from ‘1’ (lowest risk) to ‘10’ (highest risk)—
whose intent is to capture the unmitigated risk that a person
on the ground is struck by an out of control unmanned
aircraft (UA). SORA currently focuses on operations whose
GRC is no greater than ‘7’. Analogously for the ACC, 12
disjoint operational scenarios have been developed in the
form of so-called airspace encounter categories (AECs), i.e.,
by classifying the operating airspace based on the intended
operating altitude, airspace type, and airspace class. Each AEC
is then associated with a perceived level of collision risk,
expressed as an assignment to an air risk class (ARC), a
relative risk ranking from ‘1’ (lowest risk) to ‘4’ (highest
risk). Each ARC relates to the rate at which a UA would
encounter a conventionally piloted aircraft (CPA)—i.e., aircraft
with onboard human pilots—in that AEC.
Thus, ascribing a GRC and ARC provides a qualitative
determination of the initial level of risk, in the context of the
two main consequences of interest for a particular CONOPS.
The SORA then describes simple procedures to refine this
initial risk assessment into a final risk assessment.
b) Final GRC Determination: The core idea is to modify
the initial GRC based on correction factors associated with the
harm barriers. The correction factor for a given harm barrier is
a numerical value selected from { 4, 2, 1, 0, 1}, indicating
the (qualitative) extent of risk modification provided. Thus,
‘ 4’ represents the largest amount of risk reduction, ‘0’
indicates no risk modification, while ‘1’ is a risk increase.
The correction factor value used depends on barrier robust-
ness level, which the SORA qualifies as a combination of
level of integrity (i.e., the ‘safety gain provided’), and level
of assurance (i.e., the ‘proof that the claimed gain has been
achieved’). Each of the three attributes are qualitatively gauged
on a three-valued ordinal scale—{low ,medium, high}—and a
mapping is specified that relates every combination of integrity
and assurance level to robustness level. As a heuristic, for a
given integrity level, robustness level is directly proportional
to the assurance level.
The more robust a harm barrier is, the greater the amount
of risk reduction it is purported to provide, and the larger its
correction factor. The final risk assessment is then given as the
sum of the GRC and the correction factors for all the harm
barriers used. For example, if the initial GRC is ‘7’, say, and
two harm barriers are used whose robustness level is such
that their respective correction factors are  2 and  1, then
the final GRC is given as 7 + ( 2) + ( 1) = 4.
c) Final ARC Determination: Refining the initial ARC
into the final ARC depends on applying the identified strategic
mitigations and their associated robustness. The effect brought
about by using these barriers is a reduction in the encounter
rate, which is achieved by providing a) temporal and spatial
operational restrictions that reduce exposure and air traffic
density, and b) procedures and rules that restrict aircraft
dynamics, as well as airspace structure and geometry.
In general, the greater the robustness is (or is shown to be)
for a strategic mitigation, the greater the reduction claimed in
the ARC. Then, to determine the final ARC, the SORA uses
a qualitative process that takes into account: i) a qualitative
robustness level for the strategic mitigations actually used, ii) a
qualitative measure of the extent to which those mitigations
modify the contribution of specific risk factors for the ACC,
e.g., encounter rate, iii) verification of strategic mitigation
robustness, and iv) validation of the mitigations used.
3) Mitigation Recommendations: The recommendation el-
ement of the SORA gives a mapping from the combination of
the final ARC and GRC to specific threat/prevention barriers,
via a so-called Specific Assurance and Integrity Level (SAIL),
shown in Fig. 2 as the task SAIL determination. This is a
qualitatively determined rank on a six-level ordinal scale from
‘I’ to ‘VI’ that corresponds to particular threat barriers (in
SORA v1.0), or OSOs (in SORA v2.0) to be used, and the
robustness they ought to exhibit.
SORA v1.0 associates each GRC and ARC, individually,
with a particular SAIL and, in general, the latter increases
proportionally with the former. Then, it gives the SAIL for a
given CONOPS as the greater of the SAILs for the respective
GRC and the ARC. SORA v2.0 simplifies this step, providing
a single SAIL for every pair of GRC and ARC. Additionally,
based on the final ARC and its corresponding SAIL, the
SORA establishes so-called tactical mitigation performance
requirements (TMPR)—classified as {low ,medium, high}—
representing a qualitative level of risk reduction to be achieved
by the tactical mitigations to reduce the residual risk of the
ACC. The final step is barrier robustness verification, which
is, again, gauged qualitatively.
III. MOTIVATING A MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATION
The overarching intent of SORA is to provide a (qualitative)
level of confidence that a given UAS operation remains
safely controlled. As described in the preceding section, upon
applying the SORA to a CONOPS, one should expect to arrive
at recommendations on barriers (or safety objectives) and
their robustness, via a SAIL determination. Then by showing
that the applicable safety objectives have been achieved, a
sufficient (presumably high) level of confidence ought be
available that there is (acceptably) low GCC or ACC risk.
Thus, being practically inspired, and relatively uncompli-
cated in its approach to risk assessment and safety assurance,
SORA shows promise of usefulness and is, therefore, attractive
to adopt. Nevertheless, it presents a number of open issues
and inconsistencies (three of which we describe next) that we
believe ought to be resolved, and that motivate the advantage
of mathematically-based foundations as a quantitative means
for validating (certain) SORA assumptions. Later (Section IV),
we will discuss how our formal model addresses these incon-
sistencies and open issues.
i) The initial GRC of some of the identified ground collision
scenarios are inconsistent with the corresponding BTDs.
In particular, the initial GRC for the eight GCC scenarios
identified4, relies on the following risk factors: i) the expected
kinetic energy transferred in a collision given the dimensions
4Figure 8 in SORA v1.0 [1], and Table 2 in the draft SORA v2.0.
of the UA involved, ii) the operation type, i.e., within visual
line of sight (VLOS) or BVLOS, iii) the operating area type
(controlled or uncontrolled), and iv) population density in the
area overflown, i.e., sparse, populated, etc. Given these, the
scenarios involving BVLOS flight each have a higher initial
GRC than the corresponding VLOS counterparts, with all other
risk factors staying the same. For example, for a given UA, the
initial GRC for ‘BVLOS operations over a gathering of people’
(‘8’) is greater than that of the corresponding VLOS scenario
(‘7’). However, for this to be the case, BVLOS flight must
inherently introduce a greater unmitigated probability of loss
of UA control, when all other risk factors, including kinetic
energy, remain unchanged in both scenarios.
So far as we can gauge, this is not evident from the generic
BTD-based risk model underlying SORA—where the ACC
and GCC are considered to be disjoint—thereby presenting
an inconsistency. Moreover, the specific conditions or rationale
for the same have not been clarified. We submit that BVLOS
flight as a risk factor is largely relevant for the ACC rather
than the GCC. We can eliminate this inconsistency by formally
and explicitly modeling the, otherwise qualitative, relation
between the GRCs, (initial unmitigated) GCC risk, and the
contributing risk factors. As we will see later (Section IV),
a mathematically founded basis for SORA tightly couples
consequences and their risk factors, potentially allowing GRCs
to be generated.
ii) Modifying initial GRCs based on harm barrier correc-
tion factors can lead to an inconsistent risk assessment.
First, both initial and final GRC, as well as correction factors
(for a given robustness), can be viewed as a measurement on
an ordinal scale [9]. That is, they mainly support an inference
on relative risk (for GRCs), or relative risk modification (for
correction factors), with no notion of a degree of difference.
Indeed, without a mapping from GRCs to (a range of) absolute
risk values, one can only meaningfully reason about a scenario
posing greater or lesser risk than another scenario, rather than
the amount to which the risk is greater or lesser. Similar con-
straints apply to correction factors of different harm barriers.
Next, not only are arithmetic transformations (summation
in this case) inadmissible for ordinal scales, but also to
apply them to correction factors and GRCs, there must be an
equivalence between the underlying measurement scales, i.e.,
a correction factor of ‘1’ and GRC of ‘1’, say, must represent
equivalent risk levels. So far as we are aware, SORA does not
give a basis for this (assumption of) equivalence. Moreover
the mapping from harm barrier correction factors to the actual
level of risk modification provided, appears to be ad hoc.
We now give an example to illustrate the kind of problems
that can arise when modifying GRCs using correction factors.
First, we assume a (plausible) mapping from GRCs to the
probability component of absolute risk values as: ‘5’ 7! 
10 3, 10 2
⇤
, ‘6’ 7!  10 4, 10 3⇤, and ‘7’ 7!  10 5, 10 4⇤.
The interpretation is that a GRC of ‘5’, say, reflects a GCC
probability > 10 3, but  10 2, and so on. Now consider two
different operating scenarios such that the GCC probability is
slightly > 10 5 in the first scenario, and 10 4 in the second,
so that they both have the same initial GRC of ‘7’ as per the
preceding mapping. Further, assume that a harm barrier with
a medium level of robustness is used, such that its correction
factor is  2, say, corresponding to an absolute probability
reduction of 0.1, say. By applying the SORA correction factor
arithmetic, the final GRC is 7 + ( 2) = 5, i.e., a GCC
probability in the interval
 
10 3, 10 2
⇤
. However, in absolute
terms, the actual probability reduction for the first scenario is
slightly > 10 4, i.e., GRC ‘6’, while for the second scenario,
it is 10 3, i.e., also GRC ‘6’. Similar inconsistencies arise
when considering the severity component of risk.
In the general case, depending on the mapping and the
bounds chosen, such reasoning could impart a false assurance
of risk reduction especially in high-risk scenarios. That, in
turn, could adversely affect both the recommendations on the
threat barriers to be used, and stakeholders’ assessment of
the acceptability of residual risk. One possible resolution is
to provide a mapping from GRCs and correction factors to
the respective absolute values for risk and risk modification.
However, this may not be generalizable across all potential
stakeholders and operations. Another resolution is to associate
GRCs and correction factors with descriptive or alphanumeric
labels (e.g., ‘GRC-5’ instead of ‘5’, say) to preclude numerical
manipulation. In fact, the SORA does exactly this for both
initial and final ARCs, correctly regarding them as labels rather
than numerical values.
iii) There is limited explanation and validation of the basis
for the relation between barrier robustness and the modifica-
tion of the initial GRC or ARC.
From the preceding discussion, evidently, it is problematic
to apply harm barrier correction factors to numerically modify
initial GRCs. As such, changing the value of correction factors
based on harm barrier robustness, and, subsequently, using
them to modify the initial GRC does not eliminate the induced
inconsistencies. Additionally, as indicated earlier, the SORA
approach to determine and modify the initial ARCs is different
from that used for the GRCs.
To our knowledge, the JARUS consortium is continually
refining the SORA, also developing the rationale for a) how
AECs are established, given air collision risk factors, b) relat-
ing AECs to ARCs, c) the amount of risk modification a strate-
gic mitigation affords, given its robustness, and d) the extent of
risk modification that single or multiple strategic mitigations
provide, in determining the final ARC. SORA v2.0 and its
annexes, when published in their final form, may provide the
required rationale for both strategic and tactical mitigations.
Though we do not elaborate the specific details from the
draft SORA v2.0, the overall approach—as we understand it—
is a process-based qualitative determination of the degree to
which strategic mitigations modify the initial ARC, along with
prescriptive recommendations on the robustness that must be
demonstrated for the modification to be considered valid.
Intuitively, however, it is reasonable to relate the robustness
of a harm barrier or a strategic mitigation with the level of
risk modification provided for the GCC and the ACC. To
characterize the nature of this relation, a formal definition
of robustness would be required, together with a mapping to
both the severity and probability component of GCC or ACC
risk, itself expressed as an absolute (rather than relative) risk
value. As we will see next, our formal basis facilitates such a
mapping.
IV. PRELIMINARY FORMALIZATION
In this section, first we elaborate various barrier properties,
giving them a formal basis and showing how they are consis-
tent with the corresponding SORA characterizations. Then, we
develop an objective, mathematical basis for SORA based on
BTDs, explaining how they address the SORA inconsistencies
and open issues identified in Section III.
A. Foundations for Barrier Properties
1) Reliability: We first consider barrier reliability, which
we define as the probability of delivering the required service
(i.e., meeting the minimum performance requirements corres-
ponding to the risk modification functionality) under specified
operating conditions. This is equivalent to the traditional
notion of reliability, related to the probability of failure [10];
therefore we can adopt its formal definition (not given here).
For our purposes, a barrier failure or breach constitutes those
conditions when there is a deviation from the expected service,
e.g., the barrier is unavailable when required (failure on
demand), total loss of service, etc.
2) Integrity: Considering that not all failures lead to a
safety related outcome (e.g., when a barrier fails safely), we
define barrier integrity to be the probability that it is not
breached in a dangerous manner. Thus, barrier reliability is
related to all barrier failures whereas integrity considers only
the dangerous failures.5 Conservatively—i.e., when all barrier
breaches are safety critical—reliability and integrity have the
same value. The SORA concept of correction factor can now
be seen as the logarithm of barrier integrity to the base ten.
3) Assurance: We can characterize assurance in a particular
system property as justified confidence in that property. For
measurable properties, such as reliability and integrity, we can
relate confidence to the uncertainty in the measurement or
estimation, which we can formally model using a probability
distribution, through its parameters and moments [11]. For our
purposes, assurance as it relates to barriers can be captured by
(and is inversely proportional to) the uncertainty in barrier
integrity. Thus, the greater the uncertainty in an integrity
estimate, the lower the confidence and the lesser the assurance.
Based on this, we can give a mathematical interpretation to
the SORA concepts of integrity level and assurance level as
follows: partition the admissible range of quantitative values
for integrity and assurance into disjoint intervals. Then, define
a mapping from those intervals to the corresponding SORA
measurement scale, i.e., {low ,medium, high}. To establish an
appropriate mapping, we note that domain-specific input is
required on the interval thresholds or bounds, which could be
determined and validated by consortia such as JARUS.
5Although reliability affects safety, in general, a reliable system need not
always be safe. However, since a barrier is a part of the safety system its
correct or reliable operation is itself a safety requirement.
4) Robustness: The SORA concept of robustness is some-
what non-standard, being characterized as a combination of
integrity and assurance. Since our formalization for integrity
can be evaluated as a probability distribution that also quanti-
fies assurance (as the uncertainty in the integrity, expressed by
the distribution parameters and moments) the SORA notion of
barrier robustness is implicitly captured.
SORA also includes a concept of robustness level, character-
ized as a combination of barrier integrity level and assurance
level. It is straightforward to give a quantitative semantics
to robustness level based on a formalization of assurance
and integrity levels: a probability distribution of integrity,
with the distribution parameters and moments determining
the assurance, and the mapping to integrity and assurance
level—given as in the preceding discussion—establishing the
corresponding robustness level.
In general terms, however, (barrier) robustness is con-
cerned with continued (barrier) operation to provide all, or
a reasonable portion, of the expected functionality under off-
nominal conditions. This is in contrast to reliability, where
the operating conditions considered are typically nominal.
In fact, to measure this traditional notion of robustness and
rigorously capture its relation to risk modification, we must
not only consider the specific off-nominal conditions where
continued barrier operation is required, but also examine how
the particular responses provided impact safety risk. Although
we do not consider this further in the paper, as we will see
later (Section V-A), our basis for risk assessment accounts for
escalation factors, which can be seen as modeling, in part,
specific off-nominal conditions that can compromise a barrier.
B. Foundations for Risk Assessment
Recall that BTDs model (operational) risk scenarios that a
given hazard induces, and the associated mitigation measures.
Typically, we develop a BTD around a single top event of
a hazard and, in general, a CONOPS will involve multiple
hazards, each with possibly more than one top event. Thus, in
practice, we can reasonably expect to develop a plurality of
BTDs to capture the appropriate safety-related scenarios. Our
previous work has extended BTDs, introducing and formaliz-
ing the concept of safety architecture (SA) [3]. Although the
details are not in scope for this paper, in brief, an SA can be
seen as a composition of related, mutually consistent BTDs
for the identified hazards.
As such, an SA is relevant for SORA since it provides
i) consistency across various operating scenarios, accounting
for shared barriers and events, including threats and conse-
quences, ii) a framework to view the full scope of safety in
terms of the the safety system—i.e., the overall collection of
barriers—and how it contributes to SRM, iii) a more accurate
and comprehensive context for risk assessment, and iv) the
means to derive a rigorous foundation for risk assessment.
We now derive a simple, mathematical risk model based
on BTDs, and extend it to the concept of SA. Using barrier
integrities and (initial) threat probabilities, it focuses on com-
puting the reduction in the probability of the consequences
and top events, as the foundation to establish whether the risk
posed has been reduced to an acceptable level. Note that the
model does not change the initial value of severity for the
worst-case consequence(s) when determining the initial risk
level (IRL) and the residual risk level (RRL).
Consider a BTD with a single threat T , top event T,
and single consequence C. The m prevention barriers on the
incoming path I from T to T, are P1, P2, . . . , Pm. Similarly,
let the q recovery barriers on the outgoing path O from T to
C be R1, R2, . . . , Rq . We will abuse notation, letting T , T,
and C be synonymous, respectively, with the Boolean random
variables (RVs) modeling the threat, the top event, and the
consequence respectively. Likewise, Pi and Rj are Boolean
RVs modeling the prevention and recovery barriers, while the
Boolean RVs I and O model the incoming and outgoing paths
respectively, i.e., they model whether or not all the events on
the path have occurred.
Except where otherwise stated, we use the convention
Pr(X) to mean the probability distribution over all states of
the RV X , and Pr(x) to mean the probability that X is in the
state x. Since all the RVs in our case are Boolean, they can
model states such as {operational, failed} (for barriers), and
{occurs, does not occur} (in the case of threats, top events,
consequences, and escalation factors).
We now analytically derive the expressions to compute
risk (probability) reduction. Let Pr(t) represent the initial
probability that the threat T occurs, i.e., Pr(T = true) =
Pr(t). Similarly, Pr(⌧) is the marginal (i.e., unconditional)
probability for the occurrence of the top event, and Pr(c) the
marginal consequence occurrence probability. We let Pr(pi),
equivalently Pr(rj), be the unconditional barrier fragility—
denoting the opposite of barrier integrity—defined such that
integrity of the (prevention) barrier Pi, is 1  Pr(pi).
The probability of the incoming path, Pr(I), is given
as the joint probability of all the events on that path,
Pr(T, P1, . . . , Pm,T). To evaluate and simplify this expres-
sion, we assume that i) the barriers are mutually independent,
and ii) barrier breaches are mutually independent of the threats
or top events. Also, from BTD semantics, we observe that
the top event occurs if the threat occurs and all barriers
are breached. Based on these, and by applying the chain
rule of probability, it can be shown that the incoming path
probability is the product of the initial threat probability
and the fragility of all the barriers on the path. That is,
Pr(I = true) = Pr(t)Qmi=1 Pr(pi). The probability of the
outgoing path O can be similarly derived.
In the general case, i.e., as shown in Fig. 3, the top event
occurs if all the events occur on any given path. That is, the top
event occurs when any path occurs so that Pr(⌧) is evaluated
as the probability of the disjunction of the RVs for the w paths.
That is, Pr(T) = Pr (
Sw
i=1 Ii), which we can compute using
the inclusion-exclusion principle. Since we require threats to
be independent, the joint probability of a combination of
threats occurring when evaluating this expression is simply
the product of the individual threat probabilities. Also, a
BTD has exactly one path between a top event and any
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Fig. 3. Generic representation of a BTD, for a hazard H and top event T,
showing its threats and consequences, a collection of prevention and recovery
barriers, along with the escalation factors (EFs) and the escalation factor
barriers (EFBs) for a specific prevention barrier.
given consequence Ci. Hence, the residual probability of that
consequence (in the given BTD) is the probability of that path,
given by generalizing the expression for Pr(O = true), as
Pr(ci) = Pr(⌧)
Qq
j=1 Pr(rij).
However, in an SA there can be several distinct paths to
that consequence, each from a different top event. If there are
n such paths then for a consequence C, we compute Pr(C) as
the probability of the disjunction of the RVs for the n paths.
That is, Pr(C) = Pr (
Sn
i=1 Si), which we can compute using
the inclusion-exclusion principle, as for the top event.
The details of extending our formal risk model to the entire
SA, as well as uncertainty analysis, are out of scope for this
paper. For uncertainty modeling and propagation, we can use
the techniques developed in [11].
The preceding formalization addresses each of the SORA
inconsistencies and open issues identified in Section III, as
given in the order below. In particular, it:
i) explicitly captures the relation between unmitigated con-
sequence risk and the contributing risk factors. Specifically,
unmitigated consequence risk can be modeled as a BTD
without barriers, whose threats or top events are the applicable
risk factors. Then, by varying the latter and their associated
parameters, e.g., threat probability, we can construct different
scenarios, each with an assessment of initial unmitigated
consequence risk. By grouping such scenarios into equivalence
classes, we can give a formal basis for GRCs, tightly coupling
them to the relevant risk factors.
ii) exactly models how consequence risk is modified by
(harm) barrier correction factors, i.e., by formalizing both bar-
rier correction factors (see Section IV-A) and the contribution
of barrier (integrity) in estimating consequence probability
and, thereby, consequence risk.
iii) explains how barrier robustness is related to barrier risk
modification and consequence risk, i.e., by formalizing barrier
robustness as a probability distribution for barrier integrity (see
Section IV-A).
C. Illustrative Example
We illustrate the applicability of our formal basis with a
simple example extracted from a safety case we authored to
support the NASA UAS Traffic Management (UTM) project.
The intent is to show how a tool-supported implementation of
our simple formal risk model can assist SORA.
The CONOPS on which our example is based involved
conducting BVLOS flight on defined paths, with small UAs
within an operating range (OR), a pre-defined volume of
airspace that encloses, for the most part, sparsely populated
and minimally built-up areas on the surface. The air traffic
within and outside the OR includes conventionally piloted
aircraft (CPA).
Fig. 4 shows one fragment from the different BTDs created
to assess how midair collision (MAC) consequence risk would
be reduced by deploying the barriers shown with the integrity
values as indicated. The integrities have been given as nearest
order of magnitude estimates, based upon available operational
failure data, simulation data, and manufacturer specifications,
where available, or from conservative assumptions as appro-
priate. Specifically, we use ground-based surveillance (with
integrity 0.99), (a suite of) avoidance maneuvers (0.99), emer-
gency procedures (0.5), an independent flight abort mechanism
(0.999), also relying on piloting actions (0.9). From the SORA
standpoint, these represent tactical mitigations.
Fig. 4 also shows how particular controls specialize the
barriers, indicating the exact mitigation functionality used.
Note that these correspond to the SORA recommended tactical
mitigations. More generally, however, we can flexibly include
a variety of barriers and controls, beyond those given in
the SORA, whilst specifying their integrity. Based on the
initial likelihood (probability) of the threat as shown, the risk
assessment indicates that the top event (airborne conflict from
a loss of separation) has a medium RRL, as does the MAC
consequence, reduced from a high IRL. The risk levels and
initial threat probability shown are based on mapping both the
(specified and computed) event probabilities and severities to
the likelihood and severity classes of a risk classification and
acceptance matrix, e.g., as in [12].
Note that Fig. 4 represents the risk assessment of a specific
scenario as modeled by a single BTD (shown here with
a single threat and consequence). Our assurance case tool,
AdvoCATE [4], implements the formal risk model as extended
to an SA, to expand the scope of such scenario-specific risk
assessment and consolidate it over all constituent scenarios.
Although, presently, it uses point values for both barrier
integrity and the initial threat probability to give point value
results. AdvoCATE automatically reconciles barrier repetition
on a path between successive events, which occurs when
different controls of the same barrier are used—e.g., as shown
for the ground-based surveillance barrier in Fig. 4—also
implementing well-formedness rules to preclude repetition of
the same controls on a path.
The implementation computes the RRLs—in particular the
residual probability of the consequence(s) and top event(s)—
whereas the user specifies the relevant initial probabilities (and
RO classifies the intruder 
as a credible threat if 
separation of intruder 
trajectory from UA location 
and/or designated DCP is 
projected to be < 1NM
Fig. 4. Fragment of a BTD for a UAS CONOPS, showing a single threat, top event and consequence, along with the applicable prevention and recovery
barriers and their respective integrities. The threat node also indicates the initial probability of occurrence, while the top event and the consequence show the
initial and residual risk levels.
thereby also the IRLs). In principle, however, we can use
the same approach to compute both the initial and residual
probability for the events under consideration, by selecting the
appropriate barriers to include in the analysis. Additionally,
the implementation propagates the severity of the worst-case
consequence to the precursor events, via the paths to the
consequence.
V. EXTENSIONS AND ENHANCEMENTS
A. Formalizing Barrier Integrity
Based on Fig. 3 and our formal risk model (Section IV-B),
an intuitive and straightforward extension is to provide a
formal basis for determining barrier integrity, based on the
identified EFs and EFBs. We note that SORA does not contain
these concepts and, therefore, gives no recommendations on
how EFs and EFBs should be considered within the process.
Strictly speaking, although they are more relevant in barrier
design and assurance rather than operational risk assessment,
they play a critical role in operational safety, e.g., if an EF in
one BTD can be a threat in a different BTD.
As such, in our opinion, considering this additional level
of analysis can be useful and, effectively, we model barriers
as a second tier BTD (see Fig. 3). Here, the top event is
the barrier breach event, the threats are the identified EFs,
and the prevention barriers are the EFBs respectively. Thus,
if E is an EF to a barrier Pi that is managed using the EFBs
B1, B2, . . . , Br, then we can suitably modify the expression
for Pr(I), as given in Section IV-B, to compute the barrier
fragility as Pr(pi) = Pr(e)
Qr
i=1 Pr(bi). Moreover, if there
are k escalation factors, i.e., k paths Ej , we can appropriately
alter the expression for Pr(T), as developed in Section IV-B,
to determine barrier fragility as, Pr(Pi) = Pr
⇣Sk
j=1 Ej
⌘
.
B. Implementation using Bayesian Networks
The implementation of the risk assessment foundations
presented in Section IV-B and Section V-A, is limited in its
capacity to address practically relevant enhancements, such
as multi-state discrete RVs, continuous RVs, distributions,
modifications to the assumptions made in the analysis (e.g.,
of mutual independence amongst the barriers/controls), etc.
To address these gaps, we propose encoding the seman-
tics of risk modification (as described by the scenarios that
the BTDs and SA capture) using Bayesian networks (BNs).
Our motivation is their provision of a flexible probabilistic
framework that affords efficient algorithms for reasoning under
uncertainty, considering discrete and continuous RVs. Another
key advantage is the specification of prior probabilities for the
risk model parameters when there is insufficient information,
and to update the priors, e.g., using operational data.
1) Bayesian Networks: A BN is a directed acyclic graph
comprising nodes and edges, e.g., as shown in Fig. 5. Nodes
represent (discrete, or continuous) RVs, the states of each
of which are mutually exclusive. The directed edges capture
dependencies between the RVs, and can be considered to
model causal relationships. Thus, nodes linked by an edge are
not independent and the link target, i.e., the child node, shows
the dependent RV. We refer to nodes with no incoming edges
as root nodes, nodes with both incoming and outgoing edges
as intermediate nodes, and nodes with no outgoing edges as
leaf nodes.
Associated with each RV in the BN is a (prior) conditional
probability table (CPT) (for discrete RVs) or a conditional
probability distribution (CPD) (for continuous RVs). For dis-
crete RVs, the CPT specifies the conditional probability for
each state of the RV given every possible combination of the
states of its parents. If an RV has no parents, the CPT is the
same as the unconditional probability. When all CPTs for all
RVs of a BN have been specified, it effectively gives the joint
distribution over the RVs, and the BN is completely specified.
Then, we can compute the unconditional probability for any
non-root RV by marginalization [13].
Moreover, using Bayes’ theorem, we can query the BN to
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Fig. 5. BN representation of the BTD of Fig. 3.
determine the probability of a specific state of a specific RV,
as well as the joint probability of any combination of RVs
given evidence, i.e., observations on the values of other RV in
the network.
2) Implementation of the Risk Model: Our intuition is to
use the structure of a BTD (more generally, the SA) and its
semantics, to derive the topology of the BN. For example, we
can use root BN nodes to model threats, barriers, EFs, and
EFBs, intermediate BN nodes to capture top events, and leaf
BN nodes to model the various consequences.
Fig. 5 shows a BN representation for the generic BTD of
Fig. 3, the nodes of which are Boolean RVs. To show the
correspondence between the two, the identifiers of the RVs
in BN of Fig. 5 have been made synonymous with those of
the BTD elements of Fig. 3. The RVs I1 . . . Iw, S1 . . .Sn,
and E1 . . . Ek, model (the state of) specific paths in the BTD,
i.e., incoming paths from the threats to the top event, outgoing
paths from the top event to the consequences, and escalation
paths from the EFs to a barrier, respectively.
To complete the BN specification, we must also give the
CPTs for the RVs. Root node CPTs are, trivially, the cor-
responding unconditional probabilities. For instance, for the
RVs corresponding to the threats Ti, the CPTs are simply the
initial probabilities of the threats Pr(Ti). For the intermediate
and leaf nodes in the BN, the idea is that a) by applying
the chain rule, b) using the assumptions made regarding
independence relations amongst the barriers (and threats), and
c) from the semantics of the BTDs, we can rearrange and reuse
the mathematical expressions developed in Section IV-B and
Section V-A as appropriate, to derive the relevant CPTs. For
example, in Fig. 5, the CPT for the RV of the top event, T,
is Pr(T|I1, . . . , Iw), which is exactly given by the expression
for Pr(T) as in Section IV-B. In fact, this CPT is the truth
table for a Boolean OR of the RVs T,P1, . . . ,Pw. The CPTs
for the remaining intermediate and leaf nodes can be derived
in a similar way although, due to space constraints, we do not
show it here.
The BN for the SA composes the various BNs that cor-
respond to the constituent BTDs of the SA. The details of
the composition are not in scope for this paper, and the key
point is that there can be additional parents for each threat Ti
or consequence Ci. Those are the respective path RVs of the
other BTDs in the SA. Thus, in the BN of the SA, we must
update the relevant CPT. For example, for a consequence Ci
we must modify the CPT to Pr(Ci|Si,Sj), where j is an index
over the b BTDs containing the consequence modeled by the
RV Ci. By properly modifying the expression for Pr(C) given
in Section IV-B, we can exactly specify the required CPT as
Pr(Ci|Si,Sj) = Pr
⇣Sb
j=1 Sj [ Si
⌘
.
Quantifying risk reduction then amounts to querying the
BN of the SA, i.e., evaluating the marginal distribution of the
specific RVs that model the consequences, C1, . . . , Cn.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have summarized the SORA methodology, highlighting
a number of inconsistencies that motivate the benefit of
a formal underpinning. We have advanced a well-founded,
albeit preliminary, approach for quantifying risk reduction
also explaining how our formalization addresses the identi-
fied concerns. Our approach is supported by mathematically-
based notions of the relevant concepts that are quantitatively
verifiable, e.g., barrier integrity can be corroborated through
measurement, simulation, and operational monitoring, etc. We
have also illustrated the applicability of our approach through
a simple example drawn from a UAS safety case, following
which we have described a preliminary extension (to determine
barrier integrity), as well as a BN-based enhancement.
The latter offers key opportunities to further enhance risk
assessment. For example, from the standpoint of designing the
safety system, starting from a safety target we can allocate
risk—in particular, its probability component—across the var-
ious barriers known to be independent. A simplistic approach
is to equally allocate risk across all barriers. A more well-
founded approach could be to use sensitivity analysis [14],
to evaluate how barriers and risk factors contribute to overall
safety risk, and use the results to guide risk allocation. From an
assessment standpoint, such analysis can also provide insight
into the collection of barriers that have an appreciable risk
reduction impact, thereby guiding the selection of barriers
appropriate for the risk posed.
BNs also offer a framework in which to extend our risk
model, by including other models used in aviation safety that
have a probabilistic formulation [15], [16]. These could be
either directly used as input, e.g., to specify appropriate CPTs,
or transformed to be included as part of our overall risk model.
In either case, a key advantage that we perceive is accessibility
to measurable model parameters that, in turn, could update the
risk assessment based on operational monitoring.
Others have also investigated applying BNs for UAS risk
assessment [17]. The development of a principled basis to
specify the BN, based on the semantics of the safety scenarios
modeled by the BTDs and the SA, differentiates our approach
from this prior work. Along those lines, the mapping from
BTDs to BNs also has been considered previously [18],
although the approach there is to transform BTDs, first, into
fault trees and event trees, and then translate those to a BN.
Additionally, there is no notion of an SA as a composition of
BTDs that is then transformed to a BN.
A number of challenges need to be addressed to further en-
hance the practical utility of our approach. First, assumptions
made for risk analysis require careful consideration and justifi-
cation, e.g., barrier independence. Additionally, integrity quan-
tification can be problematic when barriers involve software, or
human operators and procedures, requiring careful justification
when quantified. To address the former, we can leverage our
prior work on structured assurance arguments [19], to sub-
stantiate specific (assurance) claims with concrete evidence,
through a chain of reasoning. For the latter, we envision two
alternatives: i) conduct the risk assessment considering only
those barriers that can be justifiably quantified, to gauge the
amount of residual risk to be addressed by human factors
and software. Then, using structured arguments, give rationale
for any claims of fitness for purpose and risk reduction,
supported by concrete verifiable evidence; or, ii) assume non-
informative objective priors on barrier integrities (e.g., barrier
functionality is equally likely to be effective or ineffective), to
gauge the amount of additional risk reduction required from
the remainder of the barriers whose integrity can be measured.
Moreover, the assumption of independence among barriers,
and between barriers and threats, may not always hold, e.g.,
when barriers are coupled through a common cause, or when
there are other interdependencies. Here, we must update
the models with conditional probabilities. In the BN-based
implementation, we can capture dependencies by introducing
appropriately directed edges between the RVs involved, and
also updating the CPTs of the dependent RVs.
Finally, our formal basis and its implementation can be
improved along several lines. A key enhancement is to work at
the level of controls in the risk assessment, which will require
considering barrier configurations and organization. While this
additional level of detail may not be justified for lower-risk
operations, the need for higher assurance and improved accu-
racy of the risk analysis in high-risk operations may warrant
this finer granularity. We also plan to include uncertainty
analysis and propagation into the underlying formalization
and its implementation, to rigorously address the concerns of
uncertainty in the assessment.
The SORA largely adopts qualitative risk assessment to
provide flexibility both to the NAAs in employing guidance
relevant to their state, and to UAS operators to demonstrate
that their safety measures are fit for purpose, relative to the
risk associated with their operations. The preference for a
qualitative approach cites challenges in data collection, and in
managing various associated uncertainties. However, a qual-
itative approach may be problematic for operations in more
complex, higher-risk environments. This paper underscores the
general observation that the results of quantitative analysis
under uncertainty require careful treatment. Nevertheless, it
also advocates that a qualitative analysis that is informed by,
and founded on, the rigor of quantification may be preferable.
Additionally, quantification can be advantageous, complement-
ing the SORA methodology by facilitating measurable jus-
tification of qualitative assumptions, precluding (deceptively
convincing) inconsistencies, whilst retaining its flexibility.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported in part by the SWS project, and
the UTM project, under the Airspace Operations and Safety
Program of NASA ARMD. We also thank Terry Martin (QUT,
Australia) for early discussions and feedback on some of the
ideas developed in this paper.
REFERENCES
[1] Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems, “JARUS
guidelines on Specific Operations Risk Assessment (SORA),” Final
Public Release v. 1.0, Jun. 2017. [Online]. Available: http://jarus-
rpas.org/content/jar-doc-06-sora-package
[2] European Aviation Safety Agency, “Concept of Operations for Drones.
A Risk Based Approach to Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft,” EASA
Brochure, May 2015.
[3] E. Denney, G. Pai, and I. Whiteside, “Modeling the Safety Architecture
of UAS Flight Operations,” in Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security
(SAFECOMP 2017), LNCS vol. 10488, Sep. 2017, pp. 162–178.
[4] E. Denney, G. Pai, and I. Whiteside, “Model-driven development of
safety architectures,” in 2017 ACM/IEEE 20th Intl. Conf. Model Driven
Engineering Languages and Systems (MODELS 2017), Sep. 2017, pp.
156–166.
[5] E. Denney and G. Pai, “Safety considerations for UAS ground-based
detect and avoid,” in 2016 IEEE/AIAA 35th Digital Avionics Systems
Conf. (DASC 2016), Sep. 2016, pp. 1–10.
[6] M. Johnson, J. Jung, J. Rios, J. Mercer, J. Homola, T. Prevot, D. Mulfin-
ger, and P. Kopardekar, “Flight Test Evaluation of an Unmanned Aircraft
System Traffic Management (UTM) Concept for Multiple Beyond-
Visual-Line-of-Sight Operations,” in 12th USA/Europe Air Traffic Man-
agement Research and Development Seminar (ATM2017), Jun. 2017.
[7] R. Clothier, E. Denney, and G. Pai, “Making a Risk Informed Safety
Case for Small Unmanned Aircraft System Operations,” in 17th AIAA
Aviation Technology, Integration, and Operations Conf., AIAA Aviation
Forum, AIAA 2017-3275, Jun. 2017.
[8] E. Denney and G. Pai, “Tool support for assurance case development,”
Journal of Automated Software Engineering, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 435–499,
Sep. 2018.
[9] F. S. Roberts, Measurement Theory With Applications to Decision
making, Utility, and the Social Sciences, Encyclopedia of Mathematics
and its Applications, vol. 7, Cambridge Univ. Press, Mar. 2009.
[10] K. Trivedi and A. Bobbio, Reliability and Availability Engineering.
Modeling, Analysis, and Applications. Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017.
[11] L. Yin, M. A. J. Smith, and K. S. Trivedi, “Uncertainty Analysis in
Reliability Modeling,” in Proceedings of the 2001 Annual Reliability
and Maintainability Symp. (RAMS 2001), 2001, pp. 229–234.
[12] FAA Air Traffic Organization, Safety Management System Manual
version 4.0, Federal Aviation Administration, May 2014.
[13] D. Barber, Bayesian Reasoning and Machine Learning. Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2012.
[14] H. Chan and A. Darwiche, “Sensitivity Analysis in Bayesian Networks:
From Single to Multiple Parameters,” in Proc. 20th Conf. on Uncertainty
in Artificial Intelligence (UAI 2004), 2004, pp. 67–75.
[15] R. E. Weibel and R. J. Hansman, “Safety Considerations for Operation
of Different Classes of UAVs in the NAS,” in AIAA 3rd “Unmanned
Unlimited” Technical Conf., Workshop and Exhibit, Infotech@Aerospace
Conferences, AIAA 2004-6421, Sep. 2004.
[16] A. McFadyen, T. Martin, and T. Perez, “Low-level collision risk mod-
elling for unmanned aircraft integration and management,” in Proc. 2018
IEEE Aerospace Conf., March 2018, pp. 1–10.
[17] E. Ancel, F. Capristan, J. Foster, and R. Condotta., “Real-time Risk
Assessment Framework for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM),” in 17th AIAA Aviation Technology, Integration,
and Operations Conf., AIAA Aviation Forum, AIAA 2017-3273, 2017.
[18] N. Khakzad, F. Khan, and P. Amyotte, “Dynamic Safety Analysis of
Process Systems by mapping Bow-Tie into Bayesian network,” Process
Safety and Environmental Protection, vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 46 – 53, 2013.
[19] E. Denney and G. Pai, “A methodology for the development of assurance
arguments for unmanned aircraft systems,” in 33rd Intl. System Safety
Conf. (ISSC 2015), Aug. 2015.
